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Abstract
This article examines violence against religious minorities, especially Shia groups 
in the democracy of Indonesia, focusing particularly on the case of the 2016 anti-
Milad Fatimah (Fatimah Birth Commemoration) mass mobilization performed by 
IJABI (The all-Indonesia Assembly of Ahlul Bait Associations) in Bondowoso, East 
Java, Indonesia. This article finds that the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization 
involved alliances and conspiracy between Godly Muslim groups with a varied 
agenda. Sunni militant groups from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), FPI (Islamic 
Defenders Front), Wahabi/Salafi, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) groups, 
which merged into FOKUS (Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah Communication Forum), 
were the main protagonists who played a key role in driving mass mobilization. 
Unlike previous studies that understood the anti-Shia movement merely as a form 
of affirming Islamic orthodoxy, this study finds evidence that there were wider 
agendas than the theological ones. Excluding the Shia from capturing Islamic 
public space and challenging religious authority and local power which was 
dominated by moderate Muslim groups were the socio-political agendas which 
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contributed to the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization. The involvement of 
radical Islamist groups, such as the activists of the Tarbiyah and HTI heralded a 
strong political agenda behind mass mobilization. However, the ultimate goal of 
applying Islamic Sharia will never fade from the religious movements of Islamist 
groups. 
Studi ini mengkaji kekerasan terhadap minoritas agama khususnya kelompok 
Shia di Indonesia era demokrasi. Tulisan memilih kasus aksi mobilisasi massa 
anti-Milad Fatimah yang dilaksanakan oleh IJABI (Ikatan Jama’ah Ahlul Bait 
Indonesia), Bondowoso, Jawa Timur pada 2016. Tulisan ini memeroleh temuan 
yang menarik bahwa aksi mobilisasi massa anti-Milad Fatimah, melibatkan aliansi 
longgar di antara kelompok-kelompok  Godly Muslim dengan agendanya yang 
tidak tunggal. Kelompok-kelompok militant  Sunni dari kalangan NU, FPI, 
Wahabi/Salafi dan HTI, yang menggabungkan diri ke dalam FOKUS (Forum 
Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah), merupakan aktor-aktor utama yang 
berperan penting dalam memobilisir aksi massa tersebut. Berbeda dari kajian-
kajian yang umumnya memahami gerakan anti-Shi’ah sebagai bentuk peneguhan 
ortodoksi Islam atupun homogenisasi Islam Indonesia, studi ini mendapati 
temuan yang jauh lebih besar dan kompleks dari sekedar agenda teologis itu. 
Mengekslusi Shi’ah dari ruang public Islam dan menantang otoritas keagamaan 
dan kekuasaan local yang didominasi oleh kelompok-kelompok Muslim moderat 
merupakan sejumlah agenda sosio-politik yang turut mewarnai aksi massa itu. 
Keterlibatan kelompok-kelompok Islamisme radikal seperti aktivis Gerakan 
Tarbiyah dan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), menjadi sinyalemen cukup kuat 
adanya agenda politis di balik aksi massa. Bagaimanapun, imaginasi dan cita-
cita penerapan syari’at Islam tidak akan pernah pudar dari gerakan keagamaan 
kelompok-kelompok Islamis. 
Keywords:  Sunni, Shia Mass Mobilization, Religious Militants, and 
Democratization
Introduction
After the 1998 reformation, the year of the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian 
regime and the rise of radical groups, whose ideal was to apply sharia 
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comprehensively,1 frequent occurrences of religious violence continued. 
The trend tends to increase year on year rather than decrease, as can be 
seen from the reports of various Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). 
The Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace, for example, reports an 
increasing number of violent incidents, with 135 cases in 2007, 265 cases 
in 2008, 200 cases in 2009, 216 cases in 2010, 244 cases in 2011, and 264 
cases in 2012.2 The latest figures presented by Komnas HAM reported 74 
cases in 2014, increasing to 78 cases in 2015, and reaching nearly 100 
cases in 2016.3 
Amidst this religious violence, minority groups, and particularly the 
Shia, remain the main target.4 The Shia are not merely stigmatized as a 
heretical and deviant group, but also suffer differing forms of violence 
such as discrimination, persecution, mistreatment, destruction of places 
of worship, and exclusion,5 in a number of geographical areas, including 
Batang (Central Java) in 2000 and 2006, Bondowoso and Bangil (East Java) 
in 2007, Sampang (Madura, East Java) in 2011, Jember (East Java) in 2012, 
1Robert W. Hefner, “Religious Resurgence in Contemporary Asia: Southeast Asian 
Perspectives on Capitalism, State, and the New Piety”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 69, 
No. 4 (2010), 1031-47; Noorhaidi Hasan, Islamizing Education: Integrated Islamic School and New 
Trend Formal Education Institution in Indonesia, SS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
2009: 1; Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, “Arab and ‘Indo-Arabs’ in Indonesia: Historical Dynamics, 
Social Relations and Contemporary Changes”, International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, Vol. 
13, No, 2 (2017), 45-72.
2Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (ed.), Islam, Politics and Change, the Indonesian 
Experience after the Fall of Suharto, Leiden University Press, 2016: 14; Setara Institute, Negara 
Harus Bersikap: Tiga Tahun Laporan Kondisi Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan di Indonesia, 
Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2010.
3Kompas, 5 Januari 2017.
4Chiara Formichi, “From Fluit Identities to Sectarian Labels, a Historical Investigation of 
Indonesia’s Shi’i Communities”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2014), 
101-126.
5Setara Institute, Negara Harus Bersikap: Tiga Tahun Laporan Kondisi Kebebasan Beragama/
Berkeyakinan di Indonesia, Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2010; Wahid Institute, Laporan Kebebasan 
Beragama/Berkeyakinan dan Toleransi, 2010, Jakarta: Wahid Institute. 
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Yogyakarta in 2013.6 Based on these cases, it can be said that the rise of 
frequent violence against the Shia in particular, and minority communities 
in general, has been part of the national trend in the post-New Order era. 
The emergence of violent actions against the Shia is closely related 
to an ideological contest, particularly between the Ahlus Sunnah wal 
Jama’ah (Sunni) groups versus non-Sunni groups such as the Shia. As 
representatives of mainstream Islam, Sunni Muslims have an interest 
in maintaining their religious authority and orthodoxy.7 It must be 
acknowledged that this ideological contest contributes to encouraging the 
various violent actions of a religious nature performed by conservative and 
radical Sunni against the Shia minority. In the name of Islam, they often 
justify their actions as a manifestation of a holy struggle in establishing 
authentic Islamic teaching.8 In a number of violent tragedies suffered by 
Shia groups, as outlined above, it is clear that religion plays a significant 
part in inciting hatred and suspicion, encouraging misunderstanding, and 
provoking conflict accompanied by violence.9  
However, attempting to explain violent actions against the Shia minority 
merely in terms of a contest on the ideological spectrum, which culminates 
6Fauziah, “Potret Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama di Kabupaten Bondowoso, Jawa 
Timur”, Harmoni Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius, Vol. X, No. 3 (2011), 647-661; Masdar 
Hilmy, “The Political Economy Sunni-Shi’ah Conflict in Sampang Madura”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal 
of Islamic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2015), 27-57; Chiara Formichi, “From Fluit Identities”…, 
101-126; Al-Makin, “Homsogenizing Indonesian Islam: Persecution of the Shia Group in 
Yogyakarta”, Studia Islamika Vol. 24, No. 1 (2017), 1-31; Wahyudi Akmaliah, “Kekerasan dan 
Pengusiran Atas Nama Agama Pasca Rejim Orde Baru: Studi Kasus Konflik Syi’ah Sampang”, 
Maarif: Arus Pemikiran Islam dan Sosial, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2015), 221-242.
7Chiara Formichi, “From Fluit Identities”, 101-126; Al-Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian 
Islam”, 1-31; Ken Miichi, Minority Shi’a Groups as a Part of Civil Society in Indonesia, 2016, http://
www.mei.edu/content/map/minority-shi-groups-civil-society-indonesia?print; Syamsul Rijal, 
“Internal Dynamics within Hadrami Arabs in Indonesia From Social Hierarchy to Islamic 
Doctrins”, Journal of Indonesian Islam, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2017), 1-28.
8Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (ed.), Islam, Politics and Change, the Indonesian 
Experience after the Fall of Suharto, Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016, 13.
9Haryatmoko, Dominasi Penuh Muslihat Akar Kekerasan dan Diskriminasi, Jakarta: Gramedia, 
2010, 82-83.
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in Islamic orthodoxy will certainly not give a comprehensive understanding 
of the issues. Such analysis tends to ignore the socio-political interests of 
those who claim to be defenders of Islam, for the anti-Shia groups often 
involved in violent actions in the name of Islamic authenticity are not one 
homogenous entity. The Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), Indonesian 
Council of Young Intellects and Ulama (MIUMI), Anti-Shia National 
Alliance (ANNAS), Wahabi/Salafi, conservative Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 
and Muhammadiyah are all known as orthodox Muslim groups, but the 
forms of religious orthodoxy for which they struggle will certainly never 
be identical. Perhaps they all imagine an Indonesia without Shia, but they 
do not all desire Indonesia to be an Islamic state in the same way as do 
radical Islamic groups such as HTI.10
This paper intends to analyze the new trend of violent actions against 
religious minorities, particularly Shia, which practically involves coalition 
and conspiracy between intolerant groups in the Indonesian democratic 
era. This paper argues that, behind the anti-Shia mass mobilization 
sponsored by both conservative and radical Sunni groups, there are more 
significant and more varied agenda than merely the affirmation of Islamic 
orthodoxy in Indonesia. By taking the case of the 2016 anti-Milad Fatimah 
mass mobilization in Bondowoso, it is revealed that the collective action 
involves a form of a loose coalition between the conservative NU, FPI, and 
Salafism/Wahabism among the followers of the Al-Irsyad, PKS activists, 
and HTI. Their joint interest in rejecting Milad Fatimah is the factor 
bringing them together to establish a coalition. This paper also discovers 
10Endang Turmudi dan Riza Sihbudi (ed.), Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia, Jakarta: 
LIPI, 2005, 120-153; Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam 
Transnasional di Indonesia, Jakarta: Gerakan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, the Wahid Institute dan 
Maarif Institute, 2009, 130; Masdar Hilmy, “The Politics of Realitation: The Backlash of 
Radical Islamists to Deradicalization Project in Indonesia”, Al-Jami’ah, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2013), 
129-158.
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that, behind the rejection of Milad Fatimah, there are hidden ideological 
and political agenda, specifically Islamizing public space and fighting for 
religious authority and local power. 
Shia in Bondowoso
Bondowoso is a regency in the eastern part of the province of East Java, 
with a relatively large Shia community: according to Habib Baqir, the 
chairman of IJABI Bondowoso, the number of Shia followers in this 
region is estimated to be up to 10,000 people. This number excludes 
people classified as devotees of ahlul bait (people of the House of the 
prophet), those who follow the religious traditions and rituals practiced 
by the sayyid (literally “master”) or habib (beloved) but do not expressly 
claim to be followers of Shia. In the view of NU elites, when the criteria 
include Muslims classified as devotees of ahlul bait, the number will be 
quite considerable, since the majority of NU followers are adherents 
of ahlul bait, who are considered to be direct descendants (dzurriyah) of 
Prophet Muhammad.11 
Historically, the development of Shia communities in Bondowoso 
cannot be separated from the introduction and development of Islam in 
the archipelago through the early Islamic missionaries from Gujarat, Persia, 
Arabia, etc.12 In Bondowoso, the early Islamic missionaries are derived 
from Hadramaut-Arabs who came to some regions in the archipelago in 
the eighteenth century.13 One of the earliest Hadramaut Ulamas to spread 
Islam in the Bondowoso area was al-Habib Muhammad bin Ahmad al-
11Interviews with Habib Baqir, 25 November 2017; Habib Murtadlo, 25 November 2017; 
Syarifah Nawirah and Syarifah Nawiyah, 5 Desember 2017; Habib Umar, 8 September 2017; 
and K.H. Abd Qodir Syams, 18 November 2017.
12Moh Hasim, “Syi’ah: Sejarah Timbul dan Perkembangannya di Indonesia”, Jurnal Analisa, 
Vol. 19, No. 02 (2012), 147-158.
13Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, Arab and ‘Indo-Arabs’ in Indonesia”…,  45-72.
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Muhdhor (1863-1926 M).14 With the migration of Arabs to Bondowoso, 
a village later known as the ‘Arab village’ was established, and, indeed, 
Arab city fortresses were built in the 1880s in a number of areas in East 
and Central Java, including Bondowoso.15 
Meanwhile, the polarization and tension between Sunni and Shia 
started in the 1980s when Habib Hamzah bin Ali al-Habsy, known for his 
religious knowledge, charisma, and position as the teacher of habaib and 
traditionalist Muslims in Bondowoso, declared himself a Shia follower. 
There is an extensive body of knowledge explaining that Habib Hamzah 
became a Shia follower during the Iranian revolution initiated by Imam 
Khomeini in 1979. Habib Hamzah was enthralled by the heroic story of 
Imam Khomeini and encountered new sources of knowledge from the 
intellectual thinkers of Iranian Shia Islam (such as Ali Syariati, Syahid 
Muthahari, and Allamah Thabathaba’i), which encouraged him to become 
a Shia follower.16 These facts affirm that the Shia identity in Indonesia 
was established in the New Order era, particularly following the 1979 
Iranian revolution.17 
The development of Shia communities in Bondowoso may also be 
observed from the founding of religious organizations, such as IJABI, in 
2006, which is directly connected to the central IJABI led by Jalaluddin 
Rahmat established on July 1st, 2000.18 In addition, the Shia community in 
14Abdul Qodir Umar Mauladdawilah 17 Habaib Berpengaruh di Indonesia, Malang: Bayan 
& Pustaka Basma, 2010, 87-100.
15L.W.C.V.D Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara, Jakarta: INIS, 1989, 68-70.
16Interviews with Habib Umar, 8 September 2017 and Matkur, 6 November 2017.
17Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia”, 
South East  Asia Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2002), 117-154; Azyumardi Azra, “Islamic Thought: 
Theory, Concept, and Doctrines in the Context of Southeast Asian Islam”, in K.S. Nathan & 
Muhammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges 
for the 21st Century, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005, 8-9; Masdar Hilmy, “The Political Economy”…, 
27-57; Chiara Formichi, “From Fluit Identities”…, 101-126; Al-Makin, “Homogenizing 
Indonesian Islam”…., 1-31.
18Hilman Latief, “The Identity of Shi’a Sympathizers in Contemporary Indonesia”, Journal 
32
IJIMS: Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 10, Number 1, June 2020: 25-48
Bondowoso has Majlis Ta’lim As-Shadiq, established in 1995. The founder 
and chairman of both organizations were Habib Hamzah. After Habib 
Hamzah passed away, the leadership of the two Shia organizations passed 
to his successors, Habib Baqir for IJABI and Habib Abu Thalib bin Habib 
Hamzah for As-Shadiq, until now. However, the existence of those religious 
institutions is not only a symbol of that of the Shia community, but also 
an effective instrument for the development of Shia Islam in Bondowoso.19 
Rising anti-Shia mass mobilization in 2016
With the growth of the Shia community in Bondowoso, an escalation 
of tension with Sunni groups was inevitable. The Sunni community, 
concerned about Shia growth, brought a number of complaints and, in 
their own religious preaching, started to cause alarm among Muslims by 
preaching of the heresy and danger of Shia teaching. In addition, they 
spread anti-Shia propaganda among the Muslims in Bondowoso, in which 
they would use MUI’s fatwa to legitimize their views of the heresy of Shia 
religious teachings and views. As is commonly known, MUI is a faction 
of Islamic orthodoxy that often issues fatwa on the heresy, deviance, and 
danger of Shia Islam to the majority Sunni.20
The anti-Shia sentiment found momentum in a number of events, 
such as, firstly, the disruption by a crowd suspected to be from the Sunni 
community at the inauguration of IJABI’s regional administration on 4 
June 2006. Secondly, an incident where a student of Pesantren Al-Wafa in 
of Indonesian Islam, Vol.  2, No. 2 (2008), 300-355; Chiara Formichi, “From Fluit Identities”…, 
101-126; Moh Hasim, “Syi’ah: Sejarah Timbul”…, 147-158.
19Interviews with Syaeful Bahar, 25 November 2017 and Saehan, 15 October 2017.
20Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi Pemikiran 
Hukum Islam di Indonesia 1975-1988, Jakarta: INIS, 1993, 114-126; Nur Ichwan, “The 
Local Politics of Orthodoxy The Majlis Ulama Indonesia in the Post-New Order Banten”, 
Journal of Indonesian Islam, Vol. 06, No. 1 (2012), 166-194; Dicky Sofjan, “Minoritization & 
Criminalization of Shia Islam in Indonesia”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern StudiesVol. 
XXXIX, No. 2 (2016), 29-44.
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Jambesari who identified as a follower of Shia was attacked and beaten 
on 12 August 2006. Thirdly, a mass action that attempted to burn the 
house of a Shia figure in Jambesari, kyai Mushawir, on 12 September 2006. 
Fourthly, the disruption of IJABI’s haul and teaching events in Jambesari 
on 23-24 December 2006. In general, such acts of violence against Shia 
groups are localized and prevented from igniting the sentiment of Muslims 
in Bondowoso.21 
The increasing anti-Shia sentiment in Bondowoso cannot, however, be 
separated from the tidal wave of radicalism at various levels, nationally and 
globally. In the context of the Indonesian democratic era, the opportunities 
for openness and freedom may be utilized by conservative and radical 
groups to promote their existence and religious teachings. Such minority 
groups are known to be vocal and militant in the conduct of their religion. 
In their representation of Islamic politics, the religious actions they perform 
often involve physical and symbolic instruments of violence. Their main 
agenda is the politicization of religion either for political or ideological 
interests, or both.22 
In Bondowoso, the rise of conservatism is driven by conservative and 
radical Sunni groups. The FPI, Tarbiyah Movement, or PKS activists, 
Wahabism/Salafism among the followers of Al-Irsyad, HTI, and Islamic 
groups classified as Islamic hard-liners have emerged as the new leaders of 
violence against religious minorities. Unfortunately, the existence of these 
new Islamic groups contributes substantially to the increase of religious 
intolerance, discrimination, and violence against heterodox minority 
21Imam Syaukani, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah di Bondowoso”, Harmoni Jurnal Multikultural-
Multireligius, Vol. VIII, No. 31 (2009), 85-87; Fauziah, “Potret Kerukunan Hidup”…, 647-661; 
Interview with, K.H. Abd Qodir Syams, 18 November 2017.
22Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining 
the Conservative Turn, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013; Robert W. Hefner, “Global Violence and 
Indonesian Muslim Politic”, American Anthropologist, Vol. 104, No. 3 (2002), 754-765; Masdar 
Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia Piety and Pragmatism, Singapore: ISEAS, 2010.
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groups, including the Shia.23 Since the emergence of these new variations of 
Islam, anti-Shia sectarian voices, and hatred and propaganda in Bondowoso 
have come from all directions. The anti-Shia voices crystallized into a 
collective action known as the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization of 4-6 
April 2016. The Milad Fatimah is an annual ritual routinely organized by the 
Shia group and there is usually very little tension with any Sunni groups. 
Large-scale opposition occurs when the IJABI invites national figures such 
as Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Haidar Bagir to the Milad Fatimah.24 
Unlike previous cases, the rejection of Milad Fatimah in 2016 involved 
approximately 3,500 people from various Islamic groups. This mass 
mobilization was also reported by the national and local press, in print 
and online media, leading to a potential clash between anti-Milad Fatimah 
groups and the Shia minority group unless the government ensured safety 
by mobilizing a large number of security officers. Since the anti-Shia groups 
could not force the regency administration to cancel the Milad Fatimah, 
they organized another event to compete with it, with the theme of grand 
preaching and praying together, at Mosque At-Taqwa.25 
In a series of mass actions, the anti-Milad Fatimah made various claims 
against the Shia, such as heresy and danger of Shia teaching for Islamic 
Sunni teaching as followed by most of Indonesia’s Muslims; mut’ah 
marriage; and directing insults toward the sahabat (companions) of Prophet 
Muhammad. In addition, they linked the alleged dangers posed by the 
Shia to issues of nationality, claiming on the banners and posters they 
brought to the demonstration that the existence of Shia in Indonesia 
is a factor to split the people, a real threat to the unity of the nation or 
23Endang Turmudi dan Riza Sihbudi (ed.), Islam dan Radikalisme”…, 2005; Abdurrahman 
Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam…, 2009; Nur Ichwan, “The Local Politic of Orthodoxy”…, 
166-194. 
24Interviews with Matkur, 6 November 2017; Syaeful Bahar, 25 November 2017; Habib 
Baqir, 25 November 2017; Habib Murtadlo, 25 November 2017; http://bangsaonline.com.
25http://faktasyiah.blogspot.co.id; http://m.okezone.com.  
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NKRI and national disintegration. The crowd, therefore, insisted that the 
government cancel the permit for the Milad Fatimah, as in their opinion, 
giving permission for such an event was equal to legitimatizing the Shia 
community, with their heretical teachings.26 
Classic, religious sectarian issues are evidently useful to ignite emotions 
between groups of Muslims in order to encourage action, and such issue 
framing is reminiscent of the success of Islam defending action in Jakarta. 
Both actions exploited religious sentiment to mobilize crowds in order 
to achieve political goals. A crowd of 3,500 people is large enough to 
be effective in a regency. The anti-Milad Fatimah demonstrations were 
is recorded as the largest Islamic demonstration against the Shia in 
Bondowoso. It was also through this action that an alliance between Islamic 
conservative and radical groups was realized, as they found themselves 
united, in one religious coalition, by anti-Shia sentiment.27   
Alliances among the Godly Muslim
The anti-Milad Fatimah collective action did not only involve a large number 
of people from a range of socio-religious backgrounds, but also an alliance 
between groups known as, to borrow the term used by Jeremy Menchik, 
‘Godly Muslims’.28 They consist of conservative nahdliyin, the radical FPI, 
Al-Irsyad Wahabi/Salafi, PKS activists, and HTI elements. Unlike the Islam 
Defending Action 212, which places the FPI as the main spokesman, the 
action to oppose the Milad Fatimah was pioneered by conservative nahdliyin 
elites. Among the central figures was K.H. Mohammad Hasan Abdul Muiz, 
son of K.H. Abdul Muiz Tirmidzi, the caretaker of pondok pesantren (Islamic 
Boarding School) Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki, Koncer, Bondowoso. 
26Interviews with Mudassir, 24 November 2017 and K.H. Hasan, 30 September 2017.
27Nur Ichwan, “The Local Politic of Orthodoxy”…, 166-194. Al-Makin, “Homogenizing 
Indonesian Islam”…, 1-31.
28Jeremy Menchik, “Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia”, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 56, No. 3 (2014), 591-621.
36
IJIMS: Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 10, Number 1, June 2020: 25-48
During his time in office as the chairman of MUI Bondowoso, kyai Abdul 
Muiz was known as the most vocal figure in safeguarding MUI’s fatwa 
related to Shia’s heresy and, to this end, frequently supported anti-Shia 
actions and legitimized them as Aswaja, defending actions against Shia’s 
desecrating and heretical teaching.29
When kyai Abdul Muiz al-Tirmidzi died, such anti-Shia actions were 
continued by his son, kyai Muhammad Hasan Muiz, who is, like his father, 
known to be vocal in expressing anti-Shia sentiment and propaganda. 
When the Shia people planned to hold a high-profile event, Milad Fatimah, 
and invited Shia national figures, he expressly opposed it. Together 
with the other conservative Sunni figures, he established a forum called 
FOKUS (Sunni Ulama Communication Forum), which combined the 
forces of ulama (religious scholars), kyai (religious people, mostly from 
pesantren) and pesantren alumni networks existing in the Bondowoso 
Regency. The alumni networks that joined FOKUS included IKSASS 
(Salafiyyah Syafiiyyah Situbondo Students and Alumni Association), IAS 
(Sidogiri Islamic Boarding School Alumni Association), TANAZZAHA 
(Zainul Hasan Islamic Boarding School Alumni Association), IKAPETE 
(Tebu Ireng Islamic Boarding School Alumni Association), Sarang Islamic 
Boarding School Alumni Association (Central Java), and Al-Azhar Egypt 
Alumni Association, and through this forum students and Muslims were 
mobilized to join together and oppose the Milad Fatimah.30 
The conservative NU youths took similar initiatives, forming their 
own movement called GERPAS (Anti-Shia Youth Movement). This 
organization was pioneered by a young kyai, currently an alumnus of 
pesantren Sidogiri, an increasingly prominent, kyai Mudassir, who was 
inspired by the Muslim national figures’ ijtihad in forming the Anti-Shia 
29Interviews with K.H. Abd. Qodir Syams, 18 November 2017; Syaeful Bahar, 25 November 
2017; and Matkur, 6 November 2017.
30Interviews with kyai Mudassir, 24 November 2017 and K.H. Hasan, 30 September 2017.
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National Alliance (ANNAS) in response to the Sampang Sunni-Shia 
conflict in 2011.31 Through GERPAS, he actively organizes the millennial 
generation of Muslims to join in and become involved in Aswaja defense 
actions to oppose Milad Fatimah.32   
In practice, both anti-Shia mainstream organizations, FOKUS and 
GERPAS, are the main drivers of anti-Milad Fatimah actions. The 
proponents of these movements are aware that any social movement 
needs the support of other groups to be successful in applying strong 
pressure externally. They, therefore, acquire allies by establishing alliances 
with other groups including Muslim elites from the FPI, conservative 
Islamic boarding school elites, Wahabi/Salafi groups from the Al-Irsyad 
organization branch, PKS activists, and HTI. This Islamic inter-group 
alliance successfully forced the administration of the Bondowoso regency 
and East Java province to respond seriously to its mass protests by sending 
approximately 1,700 security officers.33 
However, the establishment of coalitions between conservative and radical 
Sunni groups cannot be separated from their political interests in not only 
opposing the commemorations but also de-legitimizing Shia groups. As 
is generally true of anti-Shia movements, those involved in the anti-Milad 
Fatimah mass mobilization have a relatively uniform perspective that Shia 
is a heretic, deviant religious teaching which is a threat to Sunni teaching.34 
The conservative and radical groups label Shia as an extreme enemy 
of Islam against which it is justified to fight using violence. They believe 
that the removal of the enemy of Islam will maintain the authenticity of 
Islamic teaching. According to them, Islam has become disordered as 
31Dede Syarif, Iskandar Zulkarnain, Dicky Sofjan, “Anti-Shi’ism in Indonesia: Geneology, 
Development, and Methods”, Harmoni: Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius, Vol. 16, No.1 
(2017), 24-37.
32Interview with Mudassir and FGD, 25 September & 15 October 2017.
33FGD, 15 October 2017; http://www.timesindonesia.co.id.
34Dicky Sofjan, “Minoritization & Criminalization”…, 29-44.
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a result of Muslim leaders’ indecision about how to respond to Islam’s 
enemy, and they, therefore, criticize any tolerant and accommodative 
attitudes of Muslim groups, whom they label as ‘liberal’ protectors of the 
enemy of Islam.35
Islamizing public space
The involvement of Islamic radical groups in mass mobilization indicates 
that there is a political agenda broader than merely demanding the 
cancellation of Milad Fatimah. FPI, Tarbiyah/PKS activists, HTI, and Al-
Irsyad Wahabi/Salafi are Islamic radical groups whose religious movements 
are more politically-oriented than religious. Although they have different 
approaches and strategies, they are similar in how they apply Islamic sharia 
and Islamize power and the public space.36 
In practice, the radical HTI activists and Wahabi/Salafi choose a 
revolutionary approach to encourage socio-political change, while PKS 
activists tend to choose moderate-accommodative approaches within a 
democratic system.37 In short, we may say that the involvement of those 
Islamic political agents in the mass mobilization action is not merely related 
to the objective-manifest agenda of rejecting Milad Fatimah or delegitimizing 
Shia as a means to affirm Indonesian Islamic orthodoxy,38 but is far bigger 
and political than all of them, which is aim to Islamize the institutions of 
power. They offer sharia as an alternative to the national principle and 
35Interviews with Kyai Mudassir, 24 November 2017; K.H. Hasan, 30 September and 
Supriyadi, 2 December 2017.
36Endang Turmudi dan Riza Sihbudi (ed.), “Islam dan Radikalisme”…, 2005, 164; 
Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), “Ilusi Negara Islam”…, 2009, 164; Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), 
“Contemporary Developments”…, 35-39; M. Imdadun Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS, Dari 
Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008, 114.
37Masdar Hilmy, “Islamism and Democracy”, 117-126; Masdar Hilmy, “Radikalisme 
Agama dan Politik Demokrasi di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru”, Jurnal MIQAT, Vol. XXXIX, 
No. 2 (2015), 407-425.
38Al-Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam”…,1-31.
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emphasize its advantages over any other system, including secularism.39 
The indication of a hidden political agenda is expressed by moderate 
nahdliyin intellectuals, activists, and figures as, to borrow the conservative 
group’s term, liberal. According to them, the fact that HTI joins the anti-
Milad Fatimah mass action cannot only be textually read as their solidarity 
in affirming Islamic orthodoxy. More than that, their involvement cannot 
be separated from their mainstream political agenda, which is to replace 
the power system.40 In this case, they used the momentum of anti-Milad 
Fatimah mass protests to show their identity, existence and classical, 
political agenda, the affirmation of khilafah (caliphate). In their political 
doctrine, khilafah is the only means for Muslims to gain freedom from 
subjugation by the unfaithful and to live as directed by God.41 
HTI activists’ involvement in the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization 
was considered by the liberal-moderate nahdliyin group as a form of the 
carelessness of the conservative nahdliyin group which became the main 
promoter of the mobilization. In fact, the mass mobilization was used well 
by HTI activists to show their group identity and political agenda. The 
flag attributes and various properties of action written “la ilaaha illallahu 
muhammadur rasulullah” on sheets of black fabric were truly put on display 
in the anti-Milad Fatimah mass protests, and the presence of HTI in the 
mass action was far more dominant than that of the other participants. 
To critics of the moderate-liberal groups, the thousands of nahdliyin in the 
crowds represented only a ‘Trojan Horse’ for the Islamic political groups, 
39Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “The Road Less Travelled: Islamic Militancy in Southeast Asia”, 
Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2003), 209-232; Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, 
Militansi dan Pencarian identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, Jakarta: LP3ES dan KITLV, 
2008, 17; Greg Fealy, “Bukan Sekedar Ahok: Menjelaskan Aksi Massa pada 2 Desember”, in 
Indonesia At Melbourne, Melbourne University, 12 December, 2016.
40Interview with Syaeful Bahar, 25 November 2017; Mas’ud, 17 October 2017; and FGD, 
25 September & 15 October 2017.
41Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia, The Faltering Revival?”, Southeast Asian 
Affairs (2004), 104-121; Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy…, 2010, 117-122.
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particularly HTI, with their political agenda to affirm khilafah Islamiyah.42 
Similarly, PKS’s involvement was regarded as an impure or untrue action 
aimed at canceling the commemoration organized by the Shia group. It 
is a public secret that their religious activities are closely related to the 
Islamization agenda. Unlike the HTI that rejects the path of democracy, 
they are relatively accommodative to the democratic system in realizing 
their political agenda, which they do through the political party they have 
established, PKS. Besides formal politics, they also use socio-religious paths 
such as da’wah activities, including halaqah, dawrah, pengajian (religious 
lectures), liqa’ (meetings), rihlah (tours), mabit (overnight stays), seminars, 
workshops, and formal educational institutions such as establishing various 
Islamic integrated schools.43 They use these two paths as their principal 
means of realizing their Islamization agenda which, in accordance with 
Hasan Banna’s doctrine, starts from individual to family, community, and 
nation, and finally the world.44   
The Islamization agenda can also be seen in the involvement of other 
Islamic radical Wahabi/Salafi figures. Salafi figures from the Al-Irsyad 
organization branch and the leader of the Al-Ishlah Islamic boarding school 
are suspected to express the Islamization of power. In various popular 
Islamization actions on a national level, such as the ‘212 action’, they are 
the principal figures fully involved in the mass mobilization. Ideologically, 
they have ideals uniform with most of the ‘212 action’ leaders. The Jakarta 
Sharia Concept, for example, is adopted as an alternative to Islamization in 
42Interviews with Mas’ud, 17 October 2017 and Matkur, 6 November 2017.
43Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamizing Formal Education”…, 1-29; Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamist 
Party, Electoral Politics and Da’wah Mobilization among Youth, The Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS) in Indonesia”, Journal of Indonesian Islam, Vol. 06, No. 01 (2012), 17-47.
44Bassam Tibi, Islam dan Islamisme, Bandung: Mizan, 2012, 53-55; Suadi Asy’ari, 
“Incorporating Islamism into Secular Education System, An Attempt of Gradual Islamization 
of the State and Society by an Indonesian Tarbiyah Movement in Jambi”, Journal of Indonesian 
Islam, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2017), 29-58. Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab 
World, London: Routledge, 2004, 123.
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Bondowoso. They have a great interest in making Bondowoso an Islamic 
regency and therefore participate in any attempts toward the realization of 
regional sharia regulation.45 Any attempts of the anti-Shia groups to push 
the regional sharia regulation agenda indicate that the movement for the 
formalization of Indonesian Islamic law remains active.46
Challenging religious authority and local power 
Behind the collective agenda to reject the Milad Fatimah, there are other 
more pragmatic interests. A competitive atmosphere of fighting for religious 
authority is palpable in the mass action and in the disputes among different 
minority groups as well as between minority and majority groups. Just like 
the Shia, the conservative and radical Islamic groups are also minorities 
compared to the moderate Muslim majority. Moreover, there are disputes 
and ideological confrontations between those involved in the alliance. 
Disputes between conservative nahdliyin groups and Wahabi/Salafi groups, 
for example, are a commonplace practice in religious life in Bondowoso. 
Each group is competing to fight for and control Islamic public space.47  
The conservative and radical minority groups that are mutually derived 
from Sunni48 attempted to abate their differences and cooperated to oppose 
the Milad Fatimah. It is, however, beyond doubt that their intention to 
remove Shia is not merely rooted in ideological motives—specifically the 
Sunni theological doctrine that Shia is a heretical religious teaching.49 More 
45Interviews with some teachers of Al-Ishlah Islamic boarding school, 14 September 2017 
and Faisol Nasr bin Madi, 8 September 2017.
46Jeremy Menchik, “Productive Intolerance”…, 591-621.
47Muhammad Ansor, “Post-Islamism and the Remaking of Islamic Public Sphere in Post-
Reform Indonesia”, Studia Islamika, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2016), 471-515; Al-Makin, “Homogenizing 
Indonesian Islam”…,1-31; FGD, 25 September & 15 October 2017.
48Azyumardi Azra, “The Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah in Southeast Asia: The Liteature of 
Malay-Indonesia ‘Ulama’ and Reforms”, Heritage of Nusantara International Journal of Religious 
Literature and Heritage, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013), 1-21.
49Dicky Sofjan, “Minoritization & Criminalization”…, 29-44; Ken Miichi, “Minority 
Shi’a”…, 2016;  Al-Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam”…, 1-31.
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than that, their involvement in the action cannot be separated from the 
political motive to fight for authority among Muslim minority groups. It 
should be noted that Shia is a minority which has grown relatively strongly 
compared to Sunni minority groups. They also consider that Shia’s growth 
may seriously threaten Sunni religious authority.50 
Moreover, the contest for authority also illustrates a conflicting 
relationship between the Shia minority group and the Sunni majority 
group. Sunni conservative and radical groups exist in Bondowoso in 
numbers far below those of moderate Muslims. In the case of the Shia, 
for example, it was the moderate Muslim group that shaped the regency 
administration’s inclusive policy to give permission for the Milad Fatimah 
to take place. This condition is in contrast to other regions facing the 
same situation, such as Sampang (Madura) where conservative and radical 
groups have a dominant influence over the government’s discriminatory 
policy-making.51
The competition for authority between the conservative and radical 
groups on the one side and the moderate group on the other crosses 
the domination of both groups in religious institutional control locally. 
For example, conservative nahdliyin’s hatred of what they call ‘Said Aqiel 
Siradj’s nahdliyin’, may be read as a form of authority and power contest in 
dominating the Nahdlatul Ulama Branch Administrator (Pengurus Cabang 
Nahdlatul Ulama - PCNU) Bondowoso organization. The mass action they 
promoted to oppose the Fatimah Birth commemoration clearly indicates 
their opposition to the power of PCNU Bondowoso, which is dominated 
50Interview with Kyai Mudassir, 24 November 2017; K.H. Hasan, 30 September 2017; and 
K.H. Abd Qodir Syams, 18 November 2017.
51Khoirul Mustamir, “Agama Menegara: Potret Pembajakan Kekuasaan Negara dan 
Masa Depan Syi’ah di Jawa Timur”, Ma’arif, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2015), 268-296; A’an Suryana, 
“Discrepancy in State Practices The Case of Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi’a Minority 
Communities during the Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudoyono”, Al-Jami’ah, Vol. 5, No. 
1 (2017), 71-103.
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by the moderate-liberal group. The term ‘NU garis lurus’ (NU straight line) 
or ‘NU kanan’ (NU right wing) used by the moderate nahdliyin group to 
describe the conservative group, and the term ‘NU Said Aqiel Siradj’ with 
its liberal and pro-Shia connotations used by the conservative nahdliyin 
group about the moderate group, is clear evidence of internal competition 
within the nahdliyin in fighting for authority and Islamic institutions.52
Besides its domination of NU organization, the moderate-liberal 
nahdliyin group also has a strong influence on the regime of the regency 
administration and wider access to many semi-governmental religious 
institutions and other governmental institutions. MUI, Forum for Religious 
Harmony (FKUB), Education Council, and Local Research Council are 
some of the institutions under the control of moderate nahdliyin figures. 
MUI, which is always under the control of the conservative group, is, in the 
case of Bondowoso, controlled by the moderate-liberal group. Therefore, 
the local MUI did not fully perform its function to support the conservative 
and radical groups in influencing the government’s policy to suspend 
the event. Instead of displaying conservative behavior, MUI Bondowoso, 
particularly in the last two periods, has progressively rejected any fatwa on 
Shia heresy issued by central MUI or provincial MUI53 and, as a result, 
has been accused of being a heretic and liberal by Muslim conservative 
and radical groups.54   
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the 2016 anti-Milad Fatimah mass 
mobilization in Bondowoso had a strong ideological and socio-political 
interest. The anti-Milad Fatimah movement can be seen as the means by 
52FGD, 25 September & 15 October 2017.
53http://muijatim.org.
54Interviews with Kyai Mudassir, 24 November 2017; K.H. Hasan, 30 September; K.H. 
Abd. Qodir Syams, 18 November 2017.
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which the militant-radical Sunni elites attempted to undermine religious 
authority in the Islamic public sphere and also local power resources. 
The conservative nahdliyin, FPI, Tarbiyah or PKS activists, HTI, and 
Wahabi/Salafi wings in Al-Irsyad are the Sunni militant-radical groups, 
which became the main anti-Milad Fatimah figures allied to exclude Shia 
communities from the public sphere. Through FOKUS and GERPAS, 
they organized Muslims not only to force the cancellation of the Milad 
Fatimah event but also to delegitimize the Shia group from the public sphere 
in Bondowoso. Their main interest in doing so was not only related to 
Indonesian Islamic orthodoxy affirmation projects, but also to ideological 
and political interests. However, the involvement of HTI, PKS activists, 
and Wahabi/Salafi of Al-Irsyad in the anti-Milad Fatimah protests showed 
that there was a strong ideological-political agenda such as Islamization. 
Meanwhile, the socio-political agenda behind the anti-Milad Fatimah 
mass mobilization can be seen in the competition, particularly between 
Islamic conservative groups and Islamic moderate groups, over local power 
resources. This paper also has found that the target of the anti-Milad Fatimah 
is not only Shia community, but also the government and the Islamic 
moderate groups. In various cases of Sunni-Shia conflict in Bondowoso, the 
government and moderate Muslims always show inclusivity to the minority 
labeled as deviant. In addition, moderate Muslims have dominant access 
to various local power resources. Their closeness to local government gives 
them substantial opportunities to access various power resources such as 
the Local House of People’s Representatives, Local Research Council, etc. 
It is in this context that the rising anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization 
cannot be separated from competition for control of religious institutions 
and systems of State power at the local level.
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